B1

New problems
The B-1A mockup review occurred in late October 1971. There were 297 requests for alterations. The first of four prototype B-1A models (s/n 74-0158) flew on 23 December 1974.[15] As the program continued the per-unit cost continued to rise. In 1970, the estimated per-unit price was $40 million, and by 1972, the cost had risen slightly to $45.6 million. By 1975, this figure had climbed to $70 million.[11]

In 1976 Viktor Belenko defected to Japan with his MiG-25 "Foxbat". During debriefing he described a new "super-Foxbat" (almost certainly referring to the MiG-31) that had look-down/shoot-down radar systems in order to attack cruise missiles. This would also make any low-level penetration aircraft "visible" and easy to attack. Countering this problem would require another upgrade to the electronic countermeasures suite, already one of the most complex and expensive ever fitted. The debate over the need for the bomber opened anew, and this time the reduced low-speed dash was a particular target. Given the performance and the armament suite that was similar to the B-52, the program was increasingly questioned as a very expensive solution that appeared to have limited benefits over the existing fleet.

The program remained highly controversial. In particular, Senator William Proxmire continually derided it in public, arguing it was an outlandishly expensive dinosaur. During the 1976 federal election campaign, Jimmy Carter made it one of the Democratic Party's platforms, saying "The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."[16]


[edit] Another cancellation

The Rockwell B-1A, 1984.When Carter took office in 1977 he ordered a review of the entire program. By this point the projected cost of the program had risen to over $100 million per aircraft, although this was lifetime cost over 20 years. He was informed of the relatively new work on stealth aircraft that had started in 1975, and decided that this was a far better avenue of approach than the B-1. Pentagon officials also stated that the ALCM (Air Launched Cruise Missile) launched from the existing B-52 fleet would give the USAF equal capability of penetrating Soviet airspace. With a range of 1,500 miles (2,400 km), the ALCM could be launched well outside the range of any Soviet defenses, and penetrate at low altitude just like a bomber, but in much greater numbers. A small number of B-52 operating outside interception range could launch hundreds of ALCMs, saturating the defense. A program to improve the B-52 and develop and deploy the ALCM would cost perhaps 20% of the price to deploy the planned 244 B-1As.[16]

On 30 June 1977 Carter announced that the B-1A would be canceled in favor of ICBMs, SLBMs, and a fleet of modernized B-52s armed with ALCMs.[11] Carter called it "one of the most difficult decisions that I've made since I've been in office." No mention of the stealth work was made public, the program being top secret, but today it is known that he authorized the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) project in early 1978, which eventually led to the B-2 Spirit.[17]

Unsurprisingly, the reaction to the cancellation was split along partisan lines. Robert Dornan claimed, "They're breaking out the vodka and caviar in Moscow." In contrast, it appears the Soviets were not at all excited by this development, considering a large number of ALCMs represented a much greater threat than a smaller number of B-1s. Tass commented that "the implementation of these militaristic plans has seriously complicated efforts for the limitation of the strategic arms race."[16] Western military leaders were generally happy with the decision. Alexander Haig, then commanding NATO, described the ALCM as an "attractive alternative" to the B-1. French General Georges Buis stated "The B-1 is a formidable weapon, but not terribly useful. For the price of one bomber, you can have 200 cruise missiles."[16]

Flight tests of the four B-1A prototypes for the B-1A program continued through April 1981. The program included 70 flights totalling 378 hours. A top speed of Mach 2.22 was reached by the second B-1A. Engine testing also continued during this time with the YF101 engines totalling almost 7,600 hours.[18]


[edit] Shifting priorities
It was during this period that the Soviets, also acting in proxy through Cuba, started to exert themselves in several new theaters of action, in particular the Cuban support in Angola starting in 1975 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The U.S. strategy to this point was containment and a conventional and nuclear war in Europe, which almost all military planning had been focused on. These newer actions revealed that the military was simply incapable of supporting any sort of effort outside these narrow confines.[19]

The Army responded by accelerating its Rapid Deployment Force concept, but suffered from major problems with airlift and sealift capability. While gaming a USSR-led invasion of Iran from Afghanistan, then considered (incorrectly) to be a major Soviet goal, it was discovered that only small numbers of units could be in the field in anything close to a week. In order to slow an advance while this happened they relied on air power, but critically the Iran-Afghanistan border was outside the U.S. Navy's range, leaving this role to the Air Force. They, in turn, had limited capability to offer ground support in many areas that were outside the range of friendly airbases. Although the B-52 had the range to support on-demand global missions, the B-52's long runway requirements dramatically limited the forward basing possibilities. In real-world scenarios the capabilities of this force against any given potential target was limited, something the B-1 would be better prepared to handle due to its better takeoff performance and range.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan campaigned heavily on the platform that Carter was weak on defense, using the cancellation of the B-1 program as a prime example, a theme he continued using into the 1980s.[20] During this time Carter's defense secretary, Harold Brown, announced the stealth bomber project, apparently implying that this was the reason for the B-1 cancellation. Brown later denied this claim, stating Carter was simply opposed to any military buildup. Although Reagan's primary attack on Carter's decision was now rendered moot, he immediately changed his complaint saying that Carter was giving away secrets and politicizing the Pentagon, charges that led to a round of sparring between Brown and Reagan in the press. Interestingly, it was Brown that had led the original AMSA program, but later came to prefer the cruise missile after taking the job of Defense Secretary in 1977.