B2

Program costs
The program was the subject of public controversy for its costs to American taxpayers. In 1996 the General Accounting Office disclosed that the B-2 bomber "will be, by far, the most costly bombers to operate on a per aircraft basis" costing over three times as much as the B-1B (US$9.6 million annually) and over four times as much as the B-52H ($US6.8 million annually). In September 1997, each hour of B-2 flight necessitated 119 hours of maintenance in turn. Comparable maintenance needs for the B-52 and the B-1B are 53 and 60 hours respectively for each hour of flight. A key reason for this cost are the air-conditioned hangars large enough for the bomber's 172 ft (52.4 m) wingspan, which are needed to maintain the aircraft's stealthy properties, especially its "low-observable" stealthy skins.[20][21] These maintenance requirements raise serious questions about the ability to deploy the B-2 overseas.[22]

The total "military construction" cost related to the program was projected to be US$553.6 million in 1997 dollars. The cost to procure each B-2 "air vehicle" was US$737 million in 1997 dollars based only on air vehicle cost of US$15.48 billion.[3] The procurement cost per plane as detailed in General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, which include spare parts and software support, was $929 million per plane in 1997 dollars.[3]

The total program cost projected through 2004 was US$44.75 billion in 1997 dollars. This includes development, procurement, facilities, construction, and spare parts. The total program cost averaged US$2.13 billion per plane.[3]


[edit] Opposition
In its consideration of the fiscal year 1990 defense budget, the House Armed Services Committee trimmed $800 million from the B-2 research and development budget, while at the same time staving off a motion to kill the bomber. The opposition was bipartisan, with Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA), John Kasich (R-OH), and John G. Rowland (R-CT) authorizing the motion to kill the bomber; the growing cost of the B-2 appeared to be the factor driving the opposition. At the peak production period specified in 1989, the schedule called for spending US$7 billion to $8 billion per year in 1989 dollars, something Committee Chair Les Aspin (D-WI) said "won't fly financially."[23]

In 1990, the US Department of Defense accused Northrop of using faulty components in the flight control system. More recent issues with the bomber have included cracks in the tail. Efforts have also been made to reduce the probability of bird ingestion, which could damage engine fan blades.[24]

In time, a number of prominent members of Congress began to oppose the program's expansion, to include former Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry who cast votes against the B-2 Stealth Bomber in 1989, 1991 and 1992 while a United States Senator representing Massachusetts. By 1992, Republican President George H.W. Bush called for the cancellation of the B-2 and promised to cut military spending by 30% in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.[25]

In May 1995, on the basis of its 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study, the DOD determined that additional B-2 procurements would exacerbate efforts to develop and implement long term recapitalization plans for the USAF bomber force.

In October 1995, former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General Mike Ryan, and Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, strongly recommended against Congressional action to fund the purchase any additional B-2s, arguing that to do so would require unacceptable cuts in existing conventional and nuclear-capable aircraft to pay for the new bombers,[26] and because the military had much higher priorities on which to spend its limited procurement dollars.[27]

Some B-2 advocates argued that procuring twenty additional B-2s would save money because B-2s would be able to deeply penetrate anti-aircraft defenses and use low-cost, short-range attack weapons rather than expensive standoff weapons. However, in 1995, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and its Director of National Security Analysis, found that additional B-2s would reduce the cost of weapons expended by the bomber force by less than US$2 billion in 1995 dollars during the first two weeks of a conflict, which is when the Air Force envisions bombers would make their greatest contribution. This is a small fraction of the US$26.8 billion (in 1995 dollars) life cycle cost that the CBO projected an additional twenty B-2s would cost.[28]

In 1997, as Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee and National Security Committee, Congressman Ron Dellums, a long-time opponent of the bomber, cited five independent studies and offered an amendment to that year's defense authorization bill to cap production of the bombers with the existing 21 aircraft. The amendment was narrowly defeated.[29] Nonetheless, Congress has never approved funding for the purchase of any additional B-2 bombers to date.


[edit] UpgradesIn 2008, the US Congress funded upgrades to the B-2s weapon control systems for hitting moving targets.[30]

On 29 December 2008, Air Force officials awarded a production contract to Northrop Grumman to modernize the B-2 fleet's radar. The contract provides advanced state-of-the-art radar components, with the aim of sustained operational viability of the B-2 fleet into the future. The contract has a target value of approximately US$468 million.[31] The award follows successful flight testing with the upgraded equipment. A modification to the radar was needed since the U.S. Department of Commerce required the B-2 to use a different radar frequency.[32]